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 Critical Reflections on 15 Years of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
Abstract 
This special section of The Extractive Industries and Society brings together discussion and research 
articles 15 years after the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was launched, which 
reflect critically on the extent to which the EITI informs, empowers and improves resource 
governance. The papers provide important insight into the impact and effectiveness of the EITI, the 
role of civil society in the EITI process, the need to make disclosure more relevant to citizens and 
local communities, and the national politics of transparency in resource governance. While 
transparency itself is insufficient in addressing the multifaceted problems resource-rich countries 
face, revenue transparency can be viewed as an  ‘entry point ? into a conflicting conversation between 
companies, governments and civil society where trust and consensus can be built on issues beyond 
revenue. Future work needs to evaluate the effect of EITI more fully in the context of other 
initiatives operating globally and at the national and subnational levels, and for what and for whom 
these spaces of policy and practice are being framed and produced.  
Introduction 
In 2002, the idea for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was proposed by UK 
Prime Minister Tony Blair in a speech intended to be delivered at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg (Rich and Moberg, 2015). It was championed at the time as a multi-
stakeholder initiative capable of helping developing countries combat the resource curse by 
broadening understanding of how revenues from oil and gas and mining activities are spent and 
where they flow. The EITI was formally established in June 2003 at its first conference in London 
when the 12 EITI Principles were agreed.  
Fifteen years later views on the intervention are mixed.  On the one hand, its proponents maintain 
that, by emphasizing reporting and the tracking of payments, and disclosing publicly the details of 
financial flows, citizenries will be better positioned to hold their governments accountable and 
ensure that revenues are spent prudently. On the other hand, critics argue that the EITI has been 
merely a  ‘ƚŝĐŬ ďŽǆ ? ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ which focuses on transparency but not on accountability, due to its 
narrow focus on seeking voluntary publication, along with the verification of company payments and 
government revenues (see e.g. Rustad et al., 2017, Sovacool et al., 2016,  Van Alstine, 2014).  
This special section of The Extractive Industries and Society brings together commentaries and 
research papers which reflect critically on the extent to which the EITI informs, empowers and 
improves resource governance, as well as the core themes which it embraces.  
Origins and evolution of the EITI 
The transparency in resource governance agenda set the foundation for the emergence of the EITI 
(Haufler, 2010). Four broad trends in the 1990s and early 2000s influenced the rise of the 
transparency agenda. First, the link between natural resource wealth and poor development 
outcomes, i.e. the resource curse, was well documented (Auty, 1993; Sachs and Warner, 2001). 
Second, rather than an inevitable outcome of resource extraction, the resource curse began to be 
framed as a political-institutional challenge. This new framing towards  ‘resource-led development ? 
resonated with broader debates on  ‘good governance ? in development (Humphreys et al., 2007; 
Mehlum et al., 2006; Ross, 1999).  
Third, the legitimacy of multinational corporations (MNCs) came under intense scrutiny on issues 
such as human rights, corruption and sustainability during this era, often driven by international 
NGOs (Jenkins, 2005). Fourth, the extractive industries came under sustained criticism for its 
negative environmental and human rights impacts, and unscrupulous conduct (Gillies, 2010). As 
western-ďĂƐĞĚDEƐďĞĐĂŵĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇďƌĂŶĚƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞƚŚĞ ‘ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĂƐƵƐƵĂů ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁĂƐŶŽ
longer tenable (Frynas, 2009). For example, a Global Witness Report in 1999 on corruption of the 
Angolan State found complicity of the oil and banking sectors in plundering of state assets during 
Angola ?s civil war (Global Witness, 1999). The momentum for transparency and accountability in the 
extractive sector built from this report, driven by a global coalition of NGOs under the Publish What 
You Pay (PWYP) banner, which aimed to ensure that citizens benefit from a nĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŶĂƚƵƌĂůƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ
wealth. The PWYP coalition formally launched in 2002, has evolved into a global network of over 700 
members, and has campaigned continuously over the last decade for voluntary and mandatory 
transparency and good governance within the extractives sector (PWYP, 2017). 
The rise of the transparency agenda must also be understood in relation to two other initiatives - 
The Extractive Industries Review of the World Bank (2001-2003) and Mining Minerals and 
Sustainable Development project (2000-2002) of the International Council on Mining and Metals, 
both which sought to align the sector with the goals of sustainable development and achieve greater 
transparency of information in the extractives value chain (Buxton, 2012; World Bank, 2004). The 
EITI emerged out of the window of opportunity created by the confluence of these international 
norms and initiatives on transparency and accountability in the extractives sector.   
The origins of the EITI represents a compromise negotiated by the UK government between what 
activist NGOs wanted and what companies resisted; mandatory reporting of payments and revenues 
in the extractive sector, and it sought to provide equal transparency from governments and 
companies (Rich and Moberg, 2015). A unique feature of the EITI standard is that although it was 
driven by NGOs and industry, it is implemented by governments.  
The EITI is based on two key voluntary mechanisms  W company reporting of the payments they make 
to governments, and governments reporting the amounts they receive from companies, thus making 
the information on payments and revenues received open and available for monitoring by citizens. 
Any discrepancies between monies paid and monies received are made public. Key to the success of 
EITI, and one of its most controversial aspects, is the role of civil society in oversight, monitoring and 
public debate. This is important in ensuring that greater transparency can lead to greater 
accountability (EITI, 2017). 
Klein, in this special issue, provides a PWYP commentary ŽŶƚŚĞ/d/ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚ  ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐ ?She highlights 
how PWYP campaigning helped spur the evolution of the EITI from a loose set of reporting 
requirements to a well-respected global disclosure standard. Since its inception in 2003 the EITI has 
evolved from an initiative narrowly focused on revenue collection to an international standard which 
aims to address the wider governance of extractive resources. It reflects an ongoing process of 
negotiation and consensus building to achieve better management of natural resources. The EITI has 
not remained static. The original EITI Principles remain but the criteria for implementation and 
validation have evolved. The set of requirements known as the EITI Rules first published in 2009 and 
then revised in 2011 were replaced by the EITI Standard in 2013. The EITI Board adopted a new 2016 
EITI Standard which included several refinements to better align the standard with the extractive 
industries value chain.  
Klein describes how the adoption of the EITI Standard in 2013 and its revised edition in 2016 has 
moved EITI reports well beyond a  ‘reconciliation ? exercise to extend down the value chain to include 
information such as levels of production, corporate social expenditures, and subnational transfers. 
She notes how the EITI has driven transparency in resource governance to be an established 
international norm exemplified by the uptake of mandatory disclosure regulations worldwide, and 
voluntary disclosure of contract transparency and beneficial ownership, which will be required in 
EITI reports by 2020. 
To inform, empower and improve?  
While the EITI represents the  ‘transparency turn ? in the field of natural resource governance, the 
extent to which information disclosure within the field of global governance informs, empowers, and 
improves has come under increased scrutiny (Gupta and Mason, 2014). First, observations of 
 ‘ĚƌŽǁŶŝŶŐŝŶĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?ŚĂǀĞŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚted the need to find the balance between quality and quantity 
of information provision (Fung et al., 2007). Second, the dynamics between the powerful and 
powerless, i.e. access to and control over information, is central to this debate (Mol, 2010). Third, 
although the procedural aspects of governance by disclosure may inform and empower in some 
instances, there is limited evidence of how transparency substantially improves, for example, 
environmental quality and performance (Gupta, 2010; Mol, 2010). In this section we explore the 
extent to which the EITI informs, empower and improves resource governance, incorporating 
insights from articles in this special issue.  
The extent to which EITI successfully informs has been under sustained scrutiny, as the quality of 
data has been problematic (Van Alstine, 2014). A number of early studies found that despite the 
auditing requirement, member states and companies may not produce complete and reliable data 
(Dykstra, 2011; Gillies and Heuty, 2011; Ravat and Ufer, 2010). For example, a Revenue Watch 
Institute report in March 2011 highlighted a number of aspects of EITI implementation that were not 
met by a high percentage of EITI candidate countries, which include: ensuring that all companies 
report; agreeing on reporting templates; disclosure of all material oil, gas, and mining payments by 
companies to government and payments received by the government; and ensuring that company 
and government reports are based on audited accounts to international standards (Dykstra, 2011: 
6). Klein discusses the challenge of using and disseminating the highly technical EITI data, and the 
need to make disclosure more relevant to citizens and local communities.    
The 2013 and 2016 reforms of the Standard have sought to make improvements in this area. The 
2013 Standard significantly broadened the scope of the reporting obligations. It required disclosure 
of payment information by project, and aligned to the US Dodd-Frank Act and the EU's Accounting 
and Transparency directives. It also provided greater autonomy to the multi-stakeholder group 
(MSG), the group of government, company and civil society representatives that oversee EITI 
implementation in a country, to set objectives and tailor the standard to the local context, and 
encouraged implementing countries to publish data in open and accessible formats. Adivilah 
provides a commentary on how the EITI can enhance citizen engagement in natural resource 
governance. He argues that the scope of reporting needs to be widened to include non-fiscal aspects 
of the resource value chain to reflect the immediate concerns of citizens, such as information on the 
social and environmental impacts of resource extraction.  
The Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI, 2015) analysed the first 22 reports prepared 
under the 2013 Standard and found that while the new reports were more comprehensive and 
informative, there were still significant shortcomings, including:  
x Timeliness: the new reports generally contained data that was two years old;  
x Openness: only ten countries published data in a machine readable format which limits its 
usefulness;  
x Projects: the new reports generally did not report on a project-by-project basis; aggregation 
hides important information for end-users; and 
x Subnational revenues: most countries did not include subnational resource revenue 
transfers, which limits usefulness for local communities directly impacted by resource 
extraction.  
The 2016 Standard aims to further strengthen EITI beyond the narrow focus on revenue 
transparency, to make the disclosure process throughout the extractive industries value chain more 
effective and efficient (EITI, 2016). Countries with already robust systems are permitted to make use 
of existing reporting mechanisms for EITI data and make the results transparent at source. This is 
thought to increase government ownership of the process and reduce the multiplication of data. 
Evaluation of reports under the 2016 Standard will need to assess the extent to which disclosure is 
more relevant to citizens and local communities.    
The extent to which the EITI empowers has also been questioned (MSI Integrity, 2015; Van Alstine, 
2014). A lack of strong domestic civil society and government commitment may hinder the 
effectiveness of transparency in resource governance (Furstenberg, 2015). Foreign aid programmes 
have tried to build capacity within civil society, particularly through the empowerment of NGOs 
(Wilson and Van Alstine, 2014). However, in many transitional or semi-authoritarian countries, 
although NGOs may be present, there is little adherence by the state to democratic participation and 
values. For example, civil society in some participating countries have not been allowed to fully 
participate in the EITI process, and although civil society may be present in the MSG, the elite 
government and corporate representatives still hold power (Aaronson, 2011; Smith et al., 2011). In 
Mongolia the EITI MSG was first appointed by government officials rather than letting NGOs and 
citizens appoint their repreƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐ  ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐůĂƚĞƌ ƌĞǀĞƌƐĞĚ ? ?ĂŶĚǌĞƌďĂŝũĂŶ ?ƐMSG did 
not meet until 2010, though the country committed to join EITI in 2003 (Aaronson, 2011: 46).   
According to a survey of civil society stakeholders from implementing countries, intimidation and 
harassment of civil society and media remains a significant issue in some countries (Dykstra, 2011). 
MSI Integrity ?s 2015 report found that MSG governance processes fail to ensure the independence 
and effectiveness of civil society.    
This special issue makes a number of important contributions on the role of civil society within the 
EITI process. While Klein outlines how civil society has been able to have a seat at the table, which 
culminated in the adoption of the Civil Society Protocol in 2015, she notes the worrying backlash 
against civil society in some jurisdictions. Indeed, Öge explores how the EITI functions in 
authoritarian states. He analyses the extent to which the EITI enables civil society groups to become 
key partners in the national MSGs. Using Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan as case studies, he finds that 
governments undermine the monitoring and accountability work of independent NGOs through co-
optation, oppression and harassment. He also finds that civil and associational rights do not improve 
after EITI membership. An ongoing challenge for the initiative is to ensure that civil society remains 
an equal partner in the EITI process even in authoritarian countries.  
On the determinants of EITI compliance, Magno and Gatmaytan find that an increase in the 
perception of greater political freedom and stronger civil space increases the likelihood that a 
country with comply with EITI requirements. They highlight that this is consistent with the theory 
that multi-stakeholder initiatives require  ‘strong and legitimate civic space ? for the EITI to thrive. 
Remadji and Janszky critically analyse the implementation of EITI in Chad. They explore EITI as a 
 ‘social technology ? for transparency, as an alternative form of oil governance after previous models 
failed. They find that the complexity and high centralisation of the EITI process in Chad limited 
participation to transparency experts and educated elite. While the EITI opened some space for civil 
society groups, Remadji and Janszky note that the term  ‘civil society ? should be used carefully as civil 
society groups may not always be representatives of communities. They conclude there is a wide gap 
between the intention and real impact of EITI on governance, with the  ‘winners ? of the game being 
companies and the State. Future studies will need to evaluate the extent to which the Civil Society 
Protocol is implemented in practice.      
The extent to which the EITI improves resource governance is widely debated (Sovacool and 
Andrews, 2015; Sovacool et al, 2016). The assumption that more information is better is not always 
the case, for example the implementation of transparency does not always achieve its desired result 
(Fung et al., 2007). Indeed, early analysis has found that EITI member states do not perform better in 
corruption rankings than non-member states (Aaronson, 2011), and there is a disconnection 
between the EITI and the literature on reducing corruption and averting the resource curse (Kolstad 
and Wiig, 2009). Adding to this literature, Corrigan finds that EITI membership does not significantly 
impact control of corruption. In order to mitigate corruption, Corrigan recommends the pursuit of 
mechanisms that are complementary with the EITI such as mandatory disclosure laws. 
Contributing to the limited literature on the effect of EITI on corruption in national contexts, Villar 
and Papyrakis evaluate the impact of the EITI on corruption in Zambia. They find that 
implementation of EITI influenced a significant decrease in corruption, particularly at the early stages 
of implementation. The authors note that these results may indicate practical challenges in 
implementing EITI in its later stages, and/or lack of procedures to resolve discrepancies identified in 
reconciliation reports and to implement recommendations from the MSG.  
On the impact of EITI membership on economic development in resource rich countries, Corrigan 
finds that EITI membership significantly increases levels of GDP per capita. She highlights the 
importance for policy makers and multinational corporations that increased disclosure of revenue 
information may lead to a more attractive business climate and subsequently economic 
development.  Indeed, Malden evaluates the amount of corporate mineral exploration expenditure 
within a country to determine the effects of EITI implementation on ĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛmineral investment 
climate. ,Ğ ĨŝŶĚƐ ƚŚĂƚ /d/ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůǇ ŝŵƉĂĐƚƐ Ă ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ŵŝŶĞƌĂů ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ
attractiveness, and provides a credible signal of commitment to stable natural resource 
management. Malden notes that these findings are significant for non EITI countries, as the ability to 
attract mining investment through the EITI process may offset the costs of participation in the 
initiative.  
On how and why EITI is taken up and implemented by member countries, early literature speculated 
that gŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞďǇĚŝƐĐůŽƐƵƌĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĞǆƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐŵĂǇďĞƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞĨĂƵůƚŽƉƚŝŽŶ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
more contested options, such as mandatory restrictions or regulation, are politically precluded 
(Haufler, 2010). Indeed, Benner and Soares de Oliveira (2010: 310-311) argue that the norms of good 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇ ŚĂǀĞ ŶŽƚ ŝŶ ĨĂĐƚ ĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽƌĞ ƌƵůĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŐĂŵĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ
ůŝŬĞůǇƚŽƌĞŵĂŝŶĂ  ‘ŶŝĐŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ? ?dŚĞ/d/ĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇŝŶĂŶĚŽĨ ŝƚƐĞůĨŵĂǇŶŽƚďĞĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨ
facilitating good governance (Hilson and Maconachie, 2009). Others have stressed the importance of 
political will and government ownership of the process (Sturesson and Zobel, 2015).  
In this special issue, Magno and Gatmaytan find that high perceptions of corruption, weak rule of 
law and government ineffectiveness increase the likelihood that a country will meet EITI 
requirements. The authors note that these findings are supported by theories on compliance where 
countries participate in international agreements to change their reputation. These findings appear 
to confirm early critiques that the norms of good governance and transparency help to legitimise 
business as usual. Bebbington, Arond and Dammert provide a nuanced account of the politics of EITI 
membership.  They examine the motivations and factors that drive EITI take-up and implementation, 
exploring the interaction between national political settlements and the  “idea ? of transparency in 
resource governance. They develop a political and power-based framing of EITI to explain why three 
different Andean countries responded to EITI in different ways. Peru is an early adopter that has 
been a source of EITI innovation driven by civil society. Colombia is a late EITI adopter driven by a 
concern to join the OECD, and ŽůŝǀŝĂ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐƚ-neoliberal and resource nationalist politics led to a 
rejection of EITI. The authors identify how national responses to EITI reflect elite politics and pursuit 
of broader national agendas. This article provides important insight into how the international 
norms of transparency in resource governance interact with domestic politics.  
Conclusion 
This collection of articles provides important insight into the extent to which the EITI informs, 
empowers and improves resource governance. Transparency itself is insufficient to address the 
multifaceted problems resource-rich countries face and therefore one can be doubtful of the 
transformative potential of the EITI if it remains a technocratic and  ‘tick box ? process. However, 
revenue transparency can be viewed as an  ‘entry point ? into a conflicting conversation between 
companies, governments and civil society where trust and consensus can be built on issues beyond 
revenue, as demonstrated by the 2016 revisions of the EITI Standard. The fact that reporting on 
fiscal and legal terms as well as contracts, licenses and beneficial ownership are now happening in 
some of the EITI implementing countries demonstrates how the initiative continues to evolve.  
However, despite its effectiveness as a transparency tool, Klein highlights how the EITI fails as an 
accountability tool and to provide real impact on the ground. A key critique of the EITI is that it is 
voluntary and thus non-binding on both governments and companies (Van Alstine and Andrews, 
2015). The voluntary nature of the standard also means that it has limited reach and therefore 
effect. A large portion of global production by the extractive industries remains outside its remit, 
particularly many state-owned companies (UNCTAD, 2014). This discretion may allow companies the 
space to avoid and evade taxes (Otusanya, 2011) and governments the secrecy and opaqueness 
necessary to pursue rent-seeking and patronage (Kolstad and Soreide, 2009). Many corruption, good 
governance and human development indicators have not improved significantly in EITI participating 
countries, suggesting that greater transparency has failed to address pro-poor development in these 
countries (Wilson and Van Alstine, 2014, 2017).   
It has been a challenge to develop a process that lives up to the values that sit at the core of EITI, 
ensuring that transparency actually does lead to societal change and better development outcomes 
(O'Sullivan, 2013; Ospanova et al., 2013; Scanteam, 2011). In other words, even if the EITI can 
inform, empower and improve resource governance, to what extent does this process actually lead 
to pro-poor societal change within implementing countries? EITI has been criticised for lacking a 
robust theory of change explaining how it will contribute to societal transformation (Scanteam, 
2011). A combination of top-down and bottom-up initiatives are necessary to reach the people that 
are most affected by extractive industry projects. Subnational implementation of the EITI is a 
promising way forward that, combined with other local resource governance initiatives, may help 
address the challenge of poverty in resource-rich countries (Wilson and Van Alstine, 2017).    
It is important to remember that the EITI is not the only initiative that seeks to promote greater 
transparency and accountability in the extractives sector (Van Alstine and Andrews, 2016). 
International norms on transparency and governance in the extractive sector have been influenced 
by, inter alia: the PWYP coalition; the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI); the 
International Monetary Fund Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency; the International Finance 
Corporation Social and Environmental Performance Standards; the Equator Principles; the 
International Council on Mining and Metals Principles for Sustainable Mining; the UN conventions on 
human rights and corruption; and the emergence of mandatory disclosure laws. Future work needs 
to evaluate the effect of EITI more fully in the context of other initiatives operating globally and at 
the national and subnational levels, and for what and for whom these spaces of policy and practice 
are being framed and produced.  
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